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NOTES AND COMMENTS
STATUS OF LABOR UNIONS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT

Until the enactment of the War Labor Disputes Act, commonly
known as the Smith-Connolly Act," partisans of labor were of the
opinion that the use of peaceful coercive measures in labor disputes
had obtained both governmental and judicial approval. That statute,
the first anti-labor law in the past three presidential terms, passed
over presidential veto, has placed tremendous obstacles in the path of
such activities when directed against plants, mines or facilities in the
possession of the United States.2 While the act was primarily intended to prevent stoppage in war production,' the heated discussions
and the critical situations which preceded its passage disclosed what
disasterous effects could be produced on the national economy by the
uncontrolled activities of labor unions. When hostilities cease and
the statute is no longer operative, the government will most assuredly
be confronted with the necessity of curbing union activities that
might threaten a reconversion program. Of interest in that regard is
the question as to what, if any, legal sanctions will be available or
whether new legislation will be required.
Dicta by the United States Supreme Court in the cases of Apex
Hosiery Company v. Leader4 and United States v. Hutcheson- would
seem to indicate that the rule in the Danbury Hatters' cases6 is no
longer law and that the provisions of the Sherman Act 7 do not apply
to labor unions, but the court in those decisions never directly overruled the Danbury Hatters' cases nor declared that the Sherman Act
could have no application to union activities. It would seem, there' 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 1501 et seq.
2 Section 6(a) of the statute, 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 1506(a), reads: "Whenever
any plant, mine, or facility is in the possession of the United States, it shall be
unlawful for any person (1) to coerce, instigate, induce, conspire with, or encourage any person, to interfere, by lockout, strike, slow-down, or other interruption, with the operation of such plant, mine, or facility, or (2) to aid any such
lockout, strike, slow-down, or other interruption interfering with the operation of
such plant, mine, or facility by giving direction or guidance in the conduct of such
interruption, or by providing funds for the conduct or direction thereof or for the
payment of strike, unemployment, or other benefits to those participating therein.
No individual shall.be deemed to have violated the provisions of this section by
reason only of his having ceased work or having refused to continue to work or
to accept employment."
3 Section 10 of the statute, 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 1510, declares that the statute
shall cease to be effective at the end of six months following the termination of
hostilities in the present war, as proclaimed by the President.
4310 U. S. 469, 60 S. Ct. 982, 84 L. Ed. 1311, 128 A. L. R. 1044 (1940).
'312 U. S. 219, 61 S. Ct. 463, 85 L. Ed. 788 (1941).
6 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 301, 52 L. Ed. 498 (1908).
See also
235 U. S. 522, 35 S. Ct. 170, 59 L. Ed. 341 (1915).
7 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 et seq.
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fore, that the provisions of that statute might still be invoked, at least
in some respects, to control certain union practices.
Adequate understanding of the relationship of the Sherman Act
to labor unions can only be obtained from a study of the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court starting with the Danbury Hatters'
cases, although the decision in In re Debs must not be overlooked
even though it is earlier in point of time. While it is true that the
last mentioned case dealt more nearly with governmental control over
the mails rather than the Sherman Act, it is significant in any analysis
of this question.
Basis for the dispute which gave rise to the decision in the Danbury Hatters' cases lay in the fact that the plaintiffs therein conducted
non-union plants for the manufacture of hats which were shipped in
interstate commerce. Defendants were members of a union which, by
strikes and boycotts, strove to compel plaintiffs to unionize their
shops. The suit was designed to recover damages under the Sherman
Act on the theory that the union activities amounted to an unlawful
restraint upon interstate commerce. It was alleged therein that the
organization to which the defendants belonged was attempting to
force all manufacturers into the organization so as to be able to control
all labor and operations in the industry and that, at the time of suit,
seventy out of the eighty-two manufacturers engaged in the production of fur hats had yielded to the pressure placed on them. Specific
reliance was placed on that part of the statute which declared:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal." 9 In both decisions,
that on the pleading question as well as after trial, it was held that
the defendants were liable in damages.
When the case first reached the Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Fuller said:

".

.

. the act prohibits any combination whatever to

secure action which essentially obstructs the free flow of commerce
between the states, or restricts, in that regard, the liberty of a trader
to engage in business. The combination charged falls within the class
of restraints of trade aimed at compelling third parties and Ptrangers
involuntarily not to engage in the course of trade except on conditions
that the combination imposes." 10 After trial, Justice Holmes observed
that "irrespective of compulsion or even agreement to observe its
intimation, the circulation of a list of 'unfair dealers,' manifestly intended to put the ban upon those whose names appear therein, among
an important body of possible customers, combined with a view to
joint action and in anticipation of such reports, is within the prohibis158 U. S. 564, 15 S Ct. 900, 39 L. Ed. 1092 (1895).
9 26 Stat. at L. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. § 1.
10 208 U. S.274 at 293, 28 S.Ct. 301, 52 L. Ed. 488 at 496.
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tions of the Sherman act if it is intended to restrain and restrains
commerce amongst the states.""
Although dictum therein declares that an actual restraint on interstate commerce would violate the statute, whether by direct action or
by secondary boycoft, no mention was made of the problem as to
whether intent to accomplish that objective would suffice in the absence of an actual restraint or what the consequences would be if the
interference was confined solely to the place of manufacture or point
of shipment. Moreover, no general rule was laid down therein to
determine when the conduct would "essentially obstruct the free flow
of commerce" for although the acts complained of clearly constituted
an attempt to dominate the industry concerned the court made no
mention of domination of competitive markets as a standard for testing the essentiality of a restraint of trade.
Aroused by the decision in the Danbury Hatters' cases, partisans
of labor clamored for remedial legislation. The Clayton Act, amended
at their behest, declared: "The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust
laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor
. . organizations . . . or to forbid or restrain individual members of
such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held
or conspiracies in restraint of
or 'construed to be illegal combinations
12
trade, under the antitrust laws.'
*

The first case to require an interpretation of that provision was
Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering" wherein plaintiff, an
open-shop manufacturer of printing presses sold throughout the
country, sought an injunction against the defendants, members of a
union, to restrain them from interfering with the sale of its products
by means of a secondary boycott. The facts were essentially the same
as in the Danbury Hatters' cases except that the secondary boycott
was not as extensive being carried on only in New York State, principal center of the industry and plaintiff's main market for products
manufactured in, and shipped from, Michigan. The two cases also
differed in the relief sought, for the earlier case had demanded damages whereas injunctive relief was now being sought. It was argued
that the Clayton Act had changed the law but this contention was
decided in the negative and injunction was ordered by a divided
court. 4 Justice Pitney, speaking for the majority, said with reference
to the statute: "The section assumes the normal objects of a labor
11 235 U. S. 522 at 534, 35 S. Ct. 170, 59 L. Ed. 341 at 349.
12 38 Stat. at L. 731, 15 U. S. C. A. § 17.
13 254 U. S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349 (1921).
14 Justice Brandeis wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in by JJ. Holmes and
Clarke.
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organization to be legitimate, and declares that nothing in the Antitrust Laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation
of such organizations, or to forbid their members from lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects; and that such an organization shall
not be held in itself-merely because of its existence and operationto be an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. But
there is nothing in the section to exempt such an organization or its
members from accountability where it or they depart from its normal
and legitimate objects, and engage in an actual combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. And by no fair or permissible construction can it be taken as authorizing any activity otherwise unlawful, or
enabling a normally lawful organization to become a cloak for an
illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, as defined by
the Anti-trust Laws. 15
Lawful conduct in labor disputes did not extend to secondary boycotting, hence such conduct was condemned when the court observed:
"Congress had in mind particular industrial controversies, not a general class war . . .The extreme and harmful consequences of the construction adopted in the court below are not to be ignored . . . An
-

ordinary controversy in a manufacturing establishment, said to concern the terms or conditions of employment there, has been held a
sufficient occasion for imposing a general embargo upon the products
of the establishment and a nation-wide blockade of the channels of
interstate commerce against them, carried out by inciting sympathetic
strikes and a secondary boycott against complainant's customers, to
the great and incalculable damage of many innocent people far remote
from any connection with or control over the original and actual
dispute,-people constituting, indeed, the general public upon whom
the cost must ultimately fall, and whose vital interest in unobstructed
commerce constituted the prime and paramount concern of Congress
in enacting the Anti-trust Laws, of which the section under consideration forms, after all, a part."16
Although he had written one of the opinions in the Danbury
Hatters' cases, Justice Holmes joined in the dissenting opinion written by Justice Brandeis. The latter wrote to the effect that the intent
of the Clayton Act was to recognize the right of industrial conflict
within and beyond the narrow boundaries imposed by the majority. 17
He did not, however, attach constitutional or moral 'sanction to such
latitude for he concluded his dissent by saying: "Because I have
come to the conclusion that both the common law of a state and a
15254 U. S. 4423 at 469, 4-1 S.Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349 at 358.
16 254 U. S. 443 at 472-7, 41 S. Ct. 172, 65 L.Ed. 349 at 359-61.
17 See, for example, the statement: "But Congress did not restrict the provision
to employers and workingmen in their employ. By including 'employers and employees' and 'persons employed and persons seeking employment,' it s-owed that
it was not aiming merely at a legal relationship between a specific employer and
his employees."-254 U. S.443 at 487, 41 S. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349 at 365.
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statute of the United States declare the right of indusrial combatants
to push their struggle to the limits of the justificaion of self-interest,
I do not wish to be understood as attaching any constitutional or
moral sanction to that right. All rights are derived from the purposes
of the society in which they exist; above all rights rises duty to the
community. The conditions developed in industry may be such that
those engaged in it cannot continue their struggle without danger to
the community. But it is not for judges to determine whether such
conditions exist, nor is it their function to set the limits of permissible
contest, and to declare the duties which the new situation demands.
This is the function of the legislature, which, while limiting individual and group rights of aggression and defense, may substitute proc18
esses of justice for the more primitive method of trial by combat."
The Duplex case, like the Danbury Hatters' cases, involved clear
and substantial interference with competitive markets, but while the
intent in the Danbury Hatters' cases was to dominate the competitive
market, that concerned in the Duplex case was primarily to unionize
the plant with interference in the competitive market a subordinate
and incidental matter. The court, however, made no distinction between the two situations over that fact so left it conjecturable if intention to foster monopoly was essential to a violation of the Sherman
Act. That case also furnished no clarification as to the extent to which
the restraint must proceed before it "essentially obstructs the free flow
of commerce."
Questions thus left unanswered were taken for consideration
when the Supreme Court entertained appeals in three significant cases,
opinions in which were written by Chief Justice Taft. The first of
them, that of United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal
Company,19 involved a strike through which the union prevented the
mining of coal by local activities such as illegal picketing, intimidation of workers and destruction of property. The interference prevented the mining of some five thousand tons of coal per week, for
which the owners sought treble damages under the Sherman Act. The
complaint therein was ordered dismissed when the court concluded
that interference with interstate commerce must be intended as a
direct and not merely an incidental consequence of the conduct and,
as the quantity involved was minor when compared with a national
production of from ten to fifteen million tons per week, no such interference could be found. That idea was expressed in the following
words, to-wit: "Obstruction of coal mining, though it may prevent
coal from going into interstate commerce, is not a restraint of that
commerce unless the obstruction to mining is intended to restrain
commerce in it, or has necessarily such a direct, material, and subis

254 U. S. 443 at 488, 41 S. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349 at 366.
19 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570, 66 L. Ed. 975 (1922).
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stantial effect to restrain it that the intent reasonably must be inferred. ' 20 While the court agreed that a secondary boycott was a
restraint of trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act, still it held
that not every interference with interstate commerce fell within its
provisions and only those could be so treated when intention to interfere was found to exist or else where substantial interference had
occurred.
Further treatment of the problem came in United Leather
21
Workers' International Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Company,
where the facts were very similar to the first Coronado case except
that injunctive relief rather than damages was sought. The threatened
damage was slight, totalling only about $3,000 and injunction was
denied when the court said: "This review of the cases makes it clear
that the mere reduction in the supply of an article to be shipped in
interstate commerce by the illegal or tortious prevention of its manufacture is ordinarily an indirect and remote obstruction to that commerce. It is only when the intent or necessary effect upon such
commerce in the article is to enable those preventing the manufacture
to monopolize the supply, control its price, or discriminate as between
its would-be purchasers, that the unlawful interference with its manufacture can be said directly to burden interstate commerce. '' 22 W'hile
the doctrine of substantial interference may not have been in the mind
of Congress when it enacted the statute, the court was obliged to limit
the applicability of the statute as a practical matter to prevent every
strike-bound firm which had done business in interstate commerce
from seeking relief in the federal courts."
Perhaps influenced by the dictum in the preceding case, the mineowners in the Coronado situation amended their complaint and showed
a stoppage of output amounting to five thousand tons of coal per day
as well as an intent to drive nonunion coal off the market. This time
they succeeded, for in Coronado Coal Company v. United Mine
Workers of America24 judgment in their favor was affirmed when
the court said: "We think there was substantial evidence at the second trial in this case tending to show that the purpose of the destruction of the nines was to stop the production of nonunion coal and
prevent its shipment to markets or other states than Arkansas, where
it would by competition tend to reduce the price of the commodity
and affect injuriously the maintenance of wages for union labor in
competing mines . . 25
20 259 U. S. 344 at 411, 42 S. Ct. 570, 66 L. Ed. 975 at 995.
21265 U. S. 457, 44 S. Ct. 623, 68 L. Ed. 1104 (1924). McKenna, Van Devanter

and Butler, JJ., dissented.
265 U. S. 457 at 471, 44 S. Ct. 623, 68 L. Ed. 1104 at 1109.
23 See, for example, the dissenting opinion of Stone, Ch. J., in United Leather
V. I. U. v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 284 F. 446 (1922), particularly p. 464-5.
24268 U. S. 295, 45 S. Ct. 551, 69 L. Ed. 963 (1925).
25 268 U. S. 295 at 310, 45 S. Ct. 551, 69 L. Ed. 963 at 970.
22
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While the second Coronado case laid down a rule as to the extent
of restraint necessary where commodities in interstate commerce were
involved, it made no ruling on the question as to what might be necessary where the restraint was imposed on labor itself. In fact, that
question had never been raised prior thereto since in all the earlier
cases the alleged violation of the Sherman Act had concerned commodities moving in interstate commerce. It required the case of
Bedford Cut Stone Company v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association of North America26 to bring up that aspect of the problem. There
the plaintiff, a nonunion producer of quarried limestone shipped in
interstate commerce, sought to enjoin the defendants from preventing
laborers in other states from working on the stones so shipped. Interference by the union officials was directed against the work on
so-called "unfair" stones in an effort to compel .unionization of the
plant as its product competed with artificial stones produced elsewhere in the country in unionized shops. Injunction was granted by
the majority on the authority of the Duplex and the second Coronado
cases, Justice Sutherland saying: "Whatever may be said as to the
motives of the respondents or their general right to combine for the
purpose of redressing alleged grievances of their fellow craftsmen or
of protecting themselves or their organizations, the present combination deliberately adopted a course of conduct which directly and substantially curtailed, or threatened thus to curtail, the natural flow in
interstate commerce of a very large proportion of the building limestone production of the entire country, to the gravely probable disadvantage of producers, purchasers and the public; and it must be held
to be a combination in undue and unreasonable restraint of such commerce within the meaning of the Anti-trust Act as interpreted by
2 7this court. 1
The concept that there was no distinction between commodities
and labor where interstate commerce was concerned met with sharp
disagreement on the part of Justice Brandeis. In a vigorous dissenting opinion, he stated: "The Sherman Law was held in United States
v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32, 62 L. Ed. 968, 38 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 473, to permit capitalists to combine in another corpbration practically the whole shoe machinery industry of the country, necessarily
giving it a position of dominance over shoe-manufacturing in America.
It would, indeed, be strange if Congress had by the same act willed
to deny to members of a small craft of workingmen the right to cooperate in simply refraining from work, when that course was the
only means of self-protection against a combination of militant and
powerful employers. I cannot believe that Congress did so. '' 2s
26274 U. S. 37, 47 S. Ct. 522, 71 L. Ed. 916 (1927).
senting opinion concurred in by Holmes, J.

27

Brandeis, J., wrote a dis-

274 U. S. 37 at 54, 47 S. Ct. 522, 71 L. Ed. 916 at 923.

2S274 U. S. 37 at 65, 47 S. Ct. 522, 71 L. Ed. 916 at 928.
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'

Extremes to which the absurdity of the argument that restraint
on labor is an interference with interstate commerce might be carried
is well illustrated by the case of Levering & Garrigues Company v.
Morrin." - The plaintiff there had imported fabricated steel and iron
for use in building construction in New York. Defendants, attempting
to unionize plaintiff's plant, prevented employees from working on
the imported material. Injunction against such interference was
sought on the theory that a violation of the antitrust laws had occurred, but relief was denied on the ground that the activity was
purely local. In that regard, Justice Sutherland quoted with approval
from Industrial Association of San Francisco v. United States 0 by
saying: "The alleged conspiracy and the acts here complained of,
spent their intended and direct force upon a local situation,-for
building is as essentially local as mininig, manufacturing or growing
crops,-and if, by a resulting diminution of the commercial demand,
interstate trade was curtailed either generally or in specific instances,
that was a fortuitous consequence so remote and indirect as plainly
to cause it to fall outside the reach of the Sherman Act.":"I
With the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,3 2 dealing as it
does with limitations on the power of federal courts to grant injunctions in labor disputes, and the subsequent enactment of the Wagner
Act, " partisans of labor could well hope that the law laid down in the
Danbury Hatters' cases and in the Duplex case had been nullified as it
applied to them. Further support for that view was found in the
decision in Apex Hosiery Company v. Leader"4 in which case plaintiff
sought damages under the Sherman Act when defendants, attempting
to unionize the plant, caused a sit-down strike therein and prevented
shipment of merchandise valued at $800,000, the greater part of which
was designed for interstate shipment. Judgment for plaintiff in the
trial court was reversed on the ground that the statute did not extend
to the point of penalizing a blockage of production and shipment of
goods designed for interstate commerce.
Speaking on behalf of the majority, Justice Stone said: "While
we must regard the question whether labor unions are to some extent
and in some circumstances subject to the Act as settled in the affirmative, it is equally plain that this Court has never thought the Act to
apply to all labor union activities affecting interstate commerce."' 5
He also added:

"....

the Sherman Act was not enacted to police inter-

state transportation, or to afford a remedy for wrongs which are
29

289 U. S. 103, 53 S. Ct. 549, 77 L. Ed. 1062 (1933).

30268 U. S.64, 45 S. Ct. 403, 69 L. Ed. 849 (1925).
33 289 U. S. 103 at 108, 53 S. Ct. 549, 77 L. Ed. 1062 at 1066.
3247 Stat. at L. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. § 101 et seq.
33 49 Stat. at L.449, 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq.
34310 U. S. 469, 60 S.Ct. 982, 84 L. Ed. 1311 (1940).
Hughes, Ch. J., wrote a
dissenting opinion concurred in by McReynolds and Roberts, JJ.
-,310 U. S.469 at 489, 60 S. Ct. 982, 84 L. Ed. 1311 at 1320.
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actionable under state law, and result from combinations and conspiracies which fall short, both in their purpose and effect, of any
form of market control of a commodity, such as to 'monopolize the
supply, control its price, or discriminate between its would-be purchasers.'

"30

Although the decision regarded the Danbury Hatters' cases, as
well as the Duplex and Bedford cases, to be sound law and also reiterated the doctrine of the second Coronado case, it marked a definite
advance for labor unions by deciding that interference by. them at
point of shipment as well as at place of manufacture did not come
under the prohibition of the Sherman Act. Labor was also to receive
some latitude in its activities for the "rule of reason" laid down in
Standard Oil Company v. United States3 7 required it. Said Justice
Stone: "Strikes or agreements not to work, entered into by laborers
to compel employers to yield to their demands, may restrict to some
extent the power of employers who are parties to the dispute to compete in the market with those not subject to such demands. But under
the doctrine applied to non-labor cases, the mere fact of such restrictions on competition does not in itself bring the parties tb the agreement within the condemnation of the Sherman Act . . . Furthermore,

successful union activity, as for example consummation of a wage
agreement with employers, may have some influence on price competition by eliminating that part of such competition which is based on
differences in labor standards. Since, in order to render a labor combination effective it must eliminate the competition from nonunion
made goods . . . an elimination of price competition based on differ-

ences in labor standards is the objective of any national labor organization. But this effect on competition has not been considered to be
the kind of curtailment
of price competition prohibited by the
38
Sherman Act.

It remained for the decision in United States v. Hutcheson,39 however, to completely eliminate the Duplex and Bedford cases from the
labor scene. There the defendants, because of the unwillingness of a
brewery to assist them in a jurisdictional dispute with another trade
union growing out of a construction contract for a building for the
brewery, brought a nation-wide boycott against the brewery's products
even though it was not a party to the dispute. Criminal prosecution
under the Sherman Act followed but a demurrer to the indictment was
sustained when the court held that such statute had to be read together
with the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act and, from such
reading, the congressional intent was seen to be to effectively nullify
the Duplex and Bedford cases.
36

S. 469 at 512, 60 S. Ct. 982, 84 L. Ed. 1311 at 1333.

37221

310 U.
U.
38 310 U.
39312 U.

S.1, 31 S. Ct. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1911).

S.469 at 503, 60 S. Ct. 982, 84 L. Ed. 1311 at 1328.
S.219, 61 S. Ct. 463, 85 L. Ed. 788 (1941). Roberts, J., wrote a dis-

senting opinion concurred in by Hughes, Ch. J.
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In that regard Justice Frankfurter stated: "The Norris-LaGuardia
Act removed the fetters upon trade union activities, which according
to judicial construction § 20 of the Clayton Act had left untouched,
by still further narrowing the circumstances under which the federal
courts could grant injunctions in labor disputes. More especially, the
Act explicitly formulated the 'public policy of the United States' in
regard to the industrial conflict, and by its light established that the
allowable area of union activity was not to be restricted, as it had been
in the Duplex Printing Press Co. Case, to an immediate employeremployee relation. Therefore, whether trade union conduct consti_tutes a violation of the Sherman Law is to be determined only by
reading the Sherman Law and § 20 of the Clayton Act and the NorrisLaGuardia Act as a harmonizing text of outlawry of labor conduct...
Congress in the Norris-LaGuardia Act has expressed the public policy
of the United States and defined its conception of a 'labor dispute' in
terms that no longer leave room for doubt ... Such a dispute § 13(c)
provides, 'includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of
employment . . . regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee . . .' But to argue,

as it was urged before us, that the Duplex Printing Press Co. Case
still governs for purposes of a criminal prosecution is to say that that
conduct may in a.
which on the equity side of the court is allowable
40
criminal proceeding become the road to prison."
The Hutcheson case expressly overruled the Duplex and Bedford
cases and, as a consequence, has recognized that a secondary boycott
cannot be enjoined. By not mentioning the Danbury Hatters' cases
or the Coronado cases, the court has, however, left it conjecturable as
to just how far labor unions will be permitted to go. It may have
been the intention of the court, to be inferred from its silence thereon,
that all such activities named in the Norris-LaGuardia Act be freed
from injunctive restraint regardless of the effect on the market. The
secondary boycott applied in the Hutcheson case, however, seems to
have been sufficiently extensive to have fallen within the scope of the
second Coronado case and hence would seem to warrant the imposition
of damages under the Sherman Act. Denial of injunctive relief does
not necessarily pre-suppose that there is no ground for the imposition
of damages for, as a matter of fact, the contrary is often true. Justice
Stone, in his concurring opinion therein, would seem to think differently for he said: "Such restraints, incident to such a strike, upon
the interstate transportation of the products or supplies have been
voice, not to be
repeatedly held by this Court,.without a dissenting
41
within the reach of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.

If, as a result of the Hutcheson case, labor unions and their officials are to be free from injunctive restraints and immune from crimiU. S. 219 at 231 and- 234, 61 S. Ct. 463, 85 L. Ed. 788 at 792 and 795.
312 U. S. 219 at 239, 61 S. Ct. 463, 85 L. Ed. 788 at 797.

40 312
41
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nal prosecution under the Sherman Act regardless of the effect of
their acts upon the interstate market, and if the sole penalty for such
conduct is to be the mere imposition of damages, then Congress ought
certainly to take steps to require labor unions to become responsible
bodies. An excellent working model for any such legislation may be
found in the British "Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1927."42
Its provisions would bear careful study and the enactment of its main
features would help fill a gap which will be created by the expiration
of the War Labor Disputes Act.

M. S.

M'ARKS

CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
GARNISHMENT-PERSONS AND PROPERTY SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENTWHETHER OR NOT CONTENTS OF SAFETY DEPOSIT BOXES MAY BE REACHED
BY GARNISHMENT PROCEEDINGS-In the recent case of Morris v. Beatty,'

after judgment against the principal debtor and return of execution
unsatisfied, plaintiff commenced garnishment proceedings against a
bank. The latter answered by stating that, at the time of service of

summons upon it, it had a small balance in an account which it had
set-off against a note owed to it by the principal debtor and that it

had also rented a safe deposit box in its vaults to such judgment
debtor although it claimed to have no control over the contents thereof.
Before hearing on the answer was possible, an order in bankruptcy
restrained the plaintiff from prosecuting his garnishment action. Subsequent thereto, the garnishee permitted the principal defendant to
have access to the safety deposit box on several occasions. When the
injunction order was eventually vacated, the plaintiff caused the
garnishment proceeding to be set for hearing2 but the trial court dis-

charged the garnishee. On appeal, such decision was reversed by the
Appellate Court for the First District on the ground that the safety
deposit box and its contents were subject to garnishment as property
in the hands of a bailee and the conduct of the garnishee in permitting
the principal defendant to have access to the same placed upon it the
burden of proving that none of the contents had been removed therefrom or else to suffer judgment for the amount of the plaintiff's claim2

Although the principal question involved in the instant case has
never been passed upon before in the reviewing courts of this state,
the holding could be said to be foreshadowed by the decision in

National Safe Deposit Company v. Stead,4 which had held the provi17 Geo. V, c. 2,
1323 Ill. App. 390, 55 N. E. (2d) 830 (1944).
2 The garnishee had, in the meantime, moved for discharge on the ground that,
by failure to traverse the answer, the same stood as admitted to be true. Such
point was deemed waived, by reason of the fact that the garnishee had introduced
evidence to sustain the answer, on the authority of Pink v. Chinskey, 303 Il. App.
55, 24 N. E. (2d) 585 (1939), abst. opin.
3Framheim v. Miller, 241 Ill. App. 328 (1926), was distinguished on the ground
that the attempt there had been to punish the garnishee for contempt for refusal
42

to comply with an order to open a safety deposit box..
4 250 Ill.
584, 95 N. E. 973 (1911).

